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When should Depreciation be Deduct-
ed to Find the Rate Making Value
of Public Utilities
A discussion of some common misconceptions of the nature and determi.
nation of depreciation as affecting the fair value of public utility properties for
rate making purposes.*
H. C. KAsBRouc t
The United States Supreme Court in May and June, 1923, handed
down three decisions of great importance in public utility regulation
because they dealt with certain very fundamental questions. These
three opinions, made public at about the same time and referring
to similar issues, have been widely discussed and very frequently
quoted. The three cases may be referred to briefly as the South-
western Bell Telephone Company case, 262 U. S. 275, the Bluefield
case, 262 U. S. 679, and the Georgia Railway and Power Company
case, 262 U. S. 625. Because of their importance and the wide-spread
interest they have aroused, it is perhaps natural that any discussion
at this time of public utility rate-maling as a governmental function
should be assumed to center around these three decisions. In fact,
however, the matter of depreciation was not specifically an issue in
any of these cases nor was it touched on in any of the opinions ex-
cept-principally by implication-in the Southwestern Bell case,
and there without any discussion of what the term really means or
why it is so vitally important in governmental rate-making.
The fact is that the courts are only beginning to recognize the
pitfalls that lie in the way of a sound economic conception of depre-
ciation as affecting the rates that should be charged by public util-
ities. The fundamental issue has never been squarely presented to
the United States Supreme Court and but seldom to the Federal
District Courts or the State Courts. Where it has been most fully
presented the leading recent court decisions are opposed to the de-
duction from "value for rate-making purposes" of any estimate of
theoretical "accrued" depreciation simply and solely for lack of new-
*For the discussion of the distinction between "Accrued depreciation" and
"Observed depreciation" the writer is in large measure indebted to Mr. E. J.
Cheney, Consulting Engineer, 61 Broadway, New York City, formerly Chief of
the Division of Light, Heat, and Power, Public Service Commission, Second
District, State of New York.
tFormerly Chief of the Division of Statistics and Accounts, Public Service
Commission, Second District, State of New York.
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ness in the property whose value is in question.' There is still an
enormous amount of misunderstanding, however, in spite -or per-
haps because-of the great volume of discussion that the subject
has aroused in recent years. To the writer it seems that this mis-
understanding is due principally to a confusion of two points of
view and this paper is an attempt to clarify the situation by insisting
on a clear cut distinction between these two quite different methods
of approaching the problem.
The first of the two points of view here contrasted is that which
emphasizes the root meaning of the word "depreciation," a lessening
in value. It postulates that nearly all kinds of physical property
decrease in value as they grow older, other things being equal, and
that it is possible and desirable to measure and state this decrease
with approximate accuracy. This concept is the most natural and
the one which the mind of the average man, or of the judge who has
not made a special study of economics, wil usually grasp at when
brought face to face with the problem of public utility valuation.
It accepts as axiomatic the proposition that second hand property is
"worth" less than new property, -although a moment's consider-
ation will show that this is not universally true even in a period of
relatively stable currency values, while, during a period of rapid
inflation, as recent experience during the war years abundantly
demonstrated, appreciation due to inflation of the medium of ex-
change may more than offset any depreciation in market value due
to deterioration from age. Nevertheless, the concept of depreciation
as a gradual lessening in value, when corrected for the obvious factors
that affect the general proposition, is not in itself erroneous. But
when it is confused with the second point of view hereinafter dis-
cussed the result will be, as this paper will endeavor to show, gross
injustice and serious economic loss.
The second point of view emphasizes not value but cost. It has
come into prominence with the development of cost accounting
and it has been the basis upon which have been framed the sections
of the Income Tax Law which relate to accounting for depreciation
and the regulations of the Treasury Department pertaining thereto.
This point of view likewise is not in itself illogical or unjust. It may
be stated as follows.
An element in the cost of conducting any enterprise is the loss or
expense represented by the excess of the first cost of property em-
'Consolidated Gas Co. v. Newton, 267 Fed. 231 (unanimously affirmed by the
Supreme Court of the United States on March 6, 1922) ;New York & Queens Gas
Co. v. Newton et al, 269 Fed. 277 (Nov. 19, 1920); Nashville C. & S. L. Ry. Co.
v. U. S., 269 Fed. 351 (Dec. 7, 1920).
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ployed therein over the salvage value of the same property at the
time it becomes necessary for any reason to retire it from service.
This excess constitutes actual depreciation or retirement loss which
is an inescapable part of the cost of doing business, however it may be
recorded in the books of account. In order to state the annual oper-
ating cost truly it is necessary to give effect to this loss not only in
the year in which it is realized and definitely determined-that is to
say not only in the year when the property in question is actually
retired-but also in each year during which the loss "accrues."
Usually the loss is considered to accrue in equal annual or other
periodic installments, and the cost accounting theory of accounting
for depreciation is then referred to as the "straight line theory".
It involves two assumptions,-first, that the amount of the loss can
be satisfactorily determined in advance of its realization, and second,
that it must be spread evenly over the life of the property during
its period of service from the date of its installation to the date when
it is retired. Both of these assumptions are matters of practical
convenience and have no necessary logical basis. The exact amount
of the loss never can be known before it is realized and there is no
reason for considering that this loss must be taken up in equal annual
or quarterly or monthly installments instead of being recognized
only as a whole at the date when it becomes realized, other than the
obvious advantages of equalizing the incidence of such losses year
by year or month by month.
A variation of the straight line theory which is sometimes advo-
cated is that retirement losses, being due in most cases where public
utility property is involved, not to wear and tear but to the ne-
cessity of replacing plant and equipment which has become obsolete
or inadequate, should not be considered to "accrue" in advance of
their realization but after they have been definitely determined they
should be charged against future operation,-spread evenly, perhaps,
though this is not necessarily insisted upon, over the life of the re-
placing unit. The advocates of this plan argue with considerable
force that the loss is really a cost of the improved service resulting
from the new plant or equipment, and that their method of account-
ing would place the burden where it belongs, upon the consumer who
gets the benefit of the improved service. It is unnecessary for the
purposes of this paper to discuss whether the straight line theory
in its usual form, or what may be called the post-retirement account-
ing is preferable. However, some corollaries that are supposed to
follow logically from the theory of accounting for depreciation in
advance of its realization, and the fact that these supposed corolla-
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ries are due to the confusion of the cost accounting concept with the
simpler one of lessening value, are the points that cause most of
the trouble in public utility rate-making.
Inasmuch as the straight line theory is essentially a method of
accounting for cost, it can be properly applied only when dealing with
cost. The amount of straight line depreciation that may have
"accrued" upon certain property bears a definite mathematical re-
lation to the amount that is invested in that property by the owners
but does not bear any necessary relation to the economic value of the
property. No practical business man in his normal senses who was
considering the purchase of a plant would ever take the trouble to
have a careful estimate made of the probable life of the component
parts of the plant and the proportion of that life that had already
elapsed, and then use the theoretical depreciation so computed in
determining the price he would be willing to pay. He might and
probably would arrive at some figure to represent the excess of the
cost of a perfectly new plant over the price he would be willing to
pay for the existing plant in its present condition. But he would not
reach such a figure by any computation of "straight line deprecia-
tion". What he would actually do will be discussed hereinafter at
greater length. But the point to be emphasized now is that in
arriving at the value of the plant to him he would disregard the method
that might reasonably have been used by the present owners to
account for the cost of the plant to them.
The fact is that thanks to what the present writer considers the
most unfortunate language of the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in the basic case of Smyth vs. Ames,2 "value" has come to
have certain artificial and conventional meanings in rate cases quite
distinct from its true economic significance. Although the formula
"A fair return on fair value" is now so widely used by courts and
commissions that it is often referred to as the fundamental principle
of rate-making by regulatory bodies, it is, nevertheless, essentially
ambiguous. The economic "value" of any property used as capital
is determined by the expectancy of the income that can be derived
from it. Therefore, to base rates on "value", in the economic sense,
is merely to ascertain probable earning capacity, or, in the phrase
that is much more unpopular than it deserves to be if its implications
2Head note-"The basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of rates to
be charged by a corporation maintaining a highway under legislative sanction
must be the fair value of the property being used by it for the convenience of
the public; * * * * * * * * * * * * * What the company is entitled to ask is
a fair return upon the value of that whichit employs forthepublicconvenience."
169 U. S. 466, 42 L ed. 81g 18 Sup. Ct. 418 (r898).
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were clearly understood, "to charge what the traffic will bear."
Because few regulatory commissions or courts have conceived it
to be their duty to fix rates on the basis of earning capacity the word
"value" in the formula "A fair return on fair value", it has been held
repeatedly, cannot be taken in the sense in which economists use it
but must be given a special and peculiar meaning for "rate-making
purposes." Herein lies the root of the difficulty. For, if the concept
of "value for rate-making purposes" approximates the concept of
cost, or what may be termed "investors' sacrifice", straight line
depreciation has a definite part to play; but if the concept of "value
for rate-making purposes" approximates the concept of "market
value", straight line depreciation has no logical place therein.
Let us take the "investors' sacrifice" or cost concept of "fair
value" and see what is the relation to it of "accrued depreciation".
It is true that a logical case can be made for the deduction from cost-
whether "original cost" or "present day reproduction cost" is im-
material-of theoretical accrued depreciation, if the "fair return"
is to be based upon the sacrifice that the investors have made and if
certain fundamental conditions are met.3 Whenever accrued depre-
ciation is deducted from cost or so-called value to determine the
"rate-base" for a public utility, it is the necessary assumption, whether
recognized or not, that the investors' sacrifice concept predominates
in the consciousness of the commission, court, or other rate fixing au-
thority, and that these other fundamental conditions which we are
now about to examine are likewise met. It is moreover generally as-
sumed more or less consciously, that the conditions necessary to
make a logical case for deducting accrued depreciation exist in the
typical and normal case, whereas, as a matter of historical fact, such
conditions with public utility properties, at least in recent years,
have been the exception rather than the rule.
As the argument for deducting accrued depreciation is usually
stated the following is an illustration of its application. A Utility
starts business with a given investment, say, to make a concrete
case, Sioo,ooo. The probable average life in service of the various
3 t is to be noted that the measure of the investors' sacrifice is not necessarily
the number of dollars that were judiciously expended-Justice Brandeis' "pru-
dent investment cost"--but that a correction factor for the depreciation of our
present standard of value can logically be employed without departing from the
"investors' sacrifice" concept. This point was particularly well brought out in a
paper by Professor Shirley D. Southworth, published in the American Economic
Review for December, 1922. The explanation seems to be necessary because in
some recent discussions it has been assumed that "investment cost" meant his-
torical cost and nothing else. There are some very interesting principles involved
in the consideration of the effect of a change in the standard of value upon public
utility rate-making, but they are beyond the scope of this paper.
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units making up the plant is determined to be forty years. The
probable salvage value of such units at the end of their useful life
is estimated to be 820,000. This leaves an $8o,ooo retirement loss
to be spread over forty years which makes an annual depreciation
charge of $2,ooo, or two per cent on the original investment. Assum-
ing that the Utility's income is just sufficient to pay a fair return
on the original investment, in addition to providing for the annual
depreciation charge, assets of $2,000 will be set aside each year and
added to the Utility's original investment, in the form of cash,
additions and betterments to the original plant, or investments in
securities or other property not devoted to the Utility's own oper-
ation. Let us suppose that this process goes on for ten years and
that in each year the investors receive a fair return on their original
$ioo,ooo in addition to the $2,ooo set aside as a "depreciation reserve".
If no retirements of property are made during that ten year period
the Utility's balance sheet at the end of the period would be repre-
sented thus:
ASSET SIDE
Fixed and floating capital:
Original investment $xoo,oo0.oo
Additions in new property, cash, or
securities 20,000.00
$120,000.00
LIABILITY SIDE
Capital stock and bonds $ioo,ooo.oo
Depreciation reserve 20,000.00
$I20,000.00
If now the rates charged by such a Utility are challenged it can
hardly claim that its investment has increased $20,000 merely be-
cause of the new assets which have been acquired during the ten
years. If the fair rate of return continues to be based on the Util-
ity's investment-not, be it noted, on the value of its property,
which is a very different concept-it has not, the original investors
have not, put up one cent more than they originally put into the
enterprise. On the facts above stated there would probably be
little serious objection to basing the fair rate of return on the total
fixed and floating capital less the amount of depreciation reserve
or $12o,ooo minus $2o,ooo equals *ioo,ooo. Note, however, that
the rate-base thus determined is exactly the amount of the original
investment. There is no "depreciation" in that. If the investors
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had left in the business all or part of the return which they might
have been entitled to receive in dividends and reinvested such amount
in further additions, that would be a reinvestment of earnings upon
which the owners of the property might reasonably claim an addi-
tional return. Such reinvestment of earnings, however, is to'jbe
carefully distinguished from a reinvestment of the depreciation fund.
Under the circumstances of the foregoing illustration, then, a
fair rate-base can be fixed on the theory of "cost less depreciation".
But observe what these circumstances are.
In the first place the investors have had a fair return on their
investment since the inception of the enterprise. In the second place
they have charged and collected in the rates an amount over and
above such fair return sufficient to add to the total assets the es-
timated proportion of the ultimate retirement loss which is chargeable
to the first ten years of the plant's life. In all probability there is
not one public utility enterprise in twenty where these two funda-
mental conditions have obtained during the last ten years, certainly
not during the last five. It will not do to say, as the extreme ad-
vocates of the application of the "straight line" theory in public
utility rate cases do say, where it is clear that no adequate retirement
reserve exists, that the managers of public utilities either have
collected the annual depreciation charge in the rates and paid it out
in dividends or that, if they have not collected it, the responsibility
for doing so was theirs and the loss is the investors. The fact is that
it is only a comparatively recent theory of accounting that requires
each year to bear an equal share of the estimated total retirement
loss and that this theory has never been so generally accepted or so
definitely stated that it can fairly be held that any public utility
managers who did not follow it were inefficient.4 The income even
4There has recently appeared a pamphlet by F. W Stevens, General Val-
uation Counsel of the New York Central Lines and former Chairman of the
Public Service Commission, Second District, State of New York, on "Depre-
ciation in Public Regulation of Railroads" in which with incontrovertible logic is
brought out the fact that the accounting rules of the Inter-state Commerce Com-
mission expressly permit steam railroads the option of accounting for retirement
losses on track and roadway either through a depreciation reserve or by charging
them up only at the time the loss is actually realized; while the Bureau of Valua-
tion, by deducting a theoretical depreciation reserve from "Cost to reproduce
new" in order to find a "final value" for the railroads, penalizes those roads-
being a great majority of all the roads in the country-which, availing themselves
of the option given by the accounting rules, did not set up any depreciation re-
serve on roadway and track. Mr. Stevens' pamphlet also shows conclusively that
even if a depreciation reserve should have been established by setting aside earn-
ings which might justly have been distributed as a return to the investors, the
deduction of such a reserve from investment cost or reproduction cost would result
merely in robbing the investors of the fruits of their directors' prudence and their
own sacrifice.
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of public utilities is subject to wide fluctuations from year to year.
Whaile there is considerable to be said for the theory that requires
recognition of an equal share of retirement losses in each year's
income regardless of the earnings, a man is neither a fool nor a knave
because he holds that the recognition of such losses should vary with
earnings and that payment of regular returns to investors is more
important than regular annual accruals to a retirement reserve.
Moreover, public utility enterprises have, not only because of reg-
ulation, but because of their more direct subjection to the pressure
of public opinion, been less able to increase their revenues to meet
increased costs than have other enierprises. An increase of rates to
take care of theoretical depreciation is as unpopular as an increase
of rates to provide a larger return to investors. And the very critics
who in a rate case will argue vigorously that it was the business of
the managers of a public utility to charge rates for service sufficient
to provide an adequate reserve for accrued depreciation, are usually
the ones who would have protested even more vigorously if the man-
agement had actually adopted any such policy.
To state the argument a little differently, a charge to represent
depreciation not yet realized is not a record of an actual loss or ex-
pense, like a charge for accrued interest or accrued taxes, but a con-
venient accounting fiction. It has very definite practical advantages
which properly permit it in certain cases to be recognized as a loss
or expense. But the question of whether, and if so to what extent,
depreciation should be recognized in advance of its realization is
not primarily a question of accurate accounting or commercial moral-
ity but a question of managerial policy. 'It may easily be true for
certain classes of property and certain types of enterprises that the
most practical and in the long run the least misleading statements
of earnings and expenses can be prepared by recognizing retirement
losses only in the accounting period when they are actually realized.
It is the almost universal practice to record the retirement losses on
comparatively small units or'minor parts of plant and equipment
in this way and to measure the loss by the cost of replacing the part
without regard to the amount at which the replaced part stood
charged in the permanent investment account. The cost of these
minor replacements is generally referred to as the cost of repairs or
maintenance and looked upon as something quite distinct from the
retirement loss on major units. As a matter of fact, there is no log-
ical difference between the retirement loss on a Si,ooo transformer
and the retirement loss on a ten cent bolt. The distinction is purely
quantitative. It is quite conceivable (and indeed there are enter-
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prises whose actual condition of operation approximates this con-
ception) that there may be a business in which the retirement of a
$i,ooo unit is as unimportant, relatively to its entire operations, as the
retirement of a ten cent bolt may be to a small concern. There should
be no penalizing 6f enterprises which have been conducted in the past
on the theory that their retirement losses could be satisfactorily
accounted for at the time of their realization without the device of a
depreciation reserve, although it may be a wise policy for a regulatory
commission, which has authority so to do, to require all public util-
ities under its supervision to set up their accounts on a different theory
for the future. It is to be noted that the Public Service Commission
in New York State has never ordered any class of public utilities to
make charges for depreciation not yet realized, although it has strong-
ly recommended that all public utilities do so. Under the decision
of the New York State Court of Appeals in the New York Railways
case5 it would seem that the New York statute does not empower the
Public Service Commission to issue such an order.
To make a case for taking the amount of a theoretical deprecia-
tion reserve from the cost of invested capital in order to determine
a fair rate-base, it is necessary to show not merely that the estimated
annual proportion of the probable retirement loss is a certain amount
and that the accumulation in the retirement reserve on a given date
should be so much, but that the enterprise has had revenues in the
past sufficient to allow it to set aside such a reserve in addition to a fair
return to its investors. Where this is not true it is confiscation of the
investors' property to deduct from their actual investment the amount
that should, on certain estimates of probable life and salvage values
of plant and equipment, be in a retirement reserve at any given time.
In a case where no dividends have been paid for a considerable pe-
riod of years, it is a fair prima facie assumption that the investors
have not had a reasonable return. How then in equity can they be
penalized, in addition to the loss of income that they have already
suffered, on the theory that somehow their invested capital has de-
teriorated in value because they have failed to collect in past rates
enough to offset the theoretical proportion to date of an anticipated
future loss?
If a utility happens to have been able, not, indeed, to collect and
set aside a theoretically adequate depreciation reserve in addition
to paying a fair return on its capital, but, by foregoing just and reason-
able dividends, to set aside a small retirement reserve, the amount of
5223 N. Y. 373 (I918); P. U. R. 1918 F 125.
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such a reserve cannot equitably be deducted from its invested
capital because it has been accumulated from funds which would
otherwise have been properly available for dividends. It has there-
fore been contributed by the stockholders and not by the consumers.
This has been clearly seen and definitely expressed by a few commis-
sions, notably in New York State by Commissioner Kellogg in the
New York State Railways Case6 and by Commissioner Fennell in
the matter of natural gas rates in Elmira.7 Such a depreciation re-
serve does not represent any diminution in the investment. On the
contrary, insofar as it is a farsighted provision for a future retirement
loss, it is an addition to the value of the plant. Nor can it logically
be considered on a theory more or less frequently appealed to, as
representing a quasi "trust fund" contributed by the consumers and
not by the investors. As clearly stated by Judge Kellogg, in the
opinion above referred to, it is not a fund contributed by the consumer
but by the investors. Indeed it may reasonably be held to repre-
sent a claim of the investors against the community which the util-
ity serves and which has had service at less than its fair cost. The
investors have, so to speak, advanced a part of the cost which the
consumer should pay, but has been temporarily unable to pay, in
the hope of ultimately repaying themselves out of future earnings.
They have certainly not decreased the amount of their invested
capital by so doing.
The whole theory and practice of rate making by regulatory bodies
depends upon the conception that investors who put capital into a
public utility enterprise are entitled to payment for the use of that
capital. Such payment must be made out of the earnings of the
business. These earnings, with reference to their disposition, may
be analyzed into three parts:
(i) That which is immediately necessary to meet the cost of
running the plant and paying taxes;
(2) That which is applied to maintenance and replacements; and
(3) That which goes to the investors as payment for the use of
their capital.
Unless there is a reasonable prospect that these three needs will be
met, the necessary capital cannot be obtained and while, for any
particular period, the earnings of a given utility may be temporarily
less than sufficient to meet that period's proper requirement, a long
continuance of such a condition inevitably means the impairment
WMatter of fares in Syracuse, P. U. R. 192IC 496 (April i9, 1921).
Tp. U. R. 1921 D 266.
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of that utility's ability to render service because of the impossibil-
ity of obtaining new capital, and eventually it is likely to mean the
abandonment of the enterprise altogether. The longer such a con-
dition continues the more disastrous are the results not only to the
investors in the unfortunate utility enterprise but also to the com-
munity which the utility serves. Indeed, the effect on the community
of receiving service at less than its economic cost-for that is what
happens when the earnings of a utility are insufficient to meet the
three needs above described-is far more serious thanif, as sometimes
occurs, the community pays more than the economic cost of the ser-
vice. Municipalities and regulatory commissions are likely to forget
the fundamental fact that a utility cannot compel a community to
pay more for the service which it renders than the service is worth
to the community; but that the community can, for a time, force
the utility to render service at less than cost, although this must re-
sult in deterioration of service and may finally result in its loss.
Let us assume, for the purpose of further illustration, that a cer-
tain utility has an invested capital represented in part by stock and
in part by bonds. It may be that some or all of the stock is "water",
i.e., its par value is greater than the fair cash cost of the property
which it represents. However, as no dividends have been ipaid on the
stock for the past ten years the amount of "water" need not concern
the community which is questioning the rates charged by this
particular utility. The revenues of the utility have been sufficient
to pay bond interest and current cost of operation. The stock-
holders have had no return on their equity and they have not been
able to collect from the consuming public anything to set up as a
reserve against future retirement losses,-in other words, the rates
have not been high enough to cover the full cost of service including
a fair return to the investors and the proportionate share of estimated
"depreciation". Do the facts when thus stated seem clearly to imply
that the investors' capital has been diminished by the amount of
the provision for future losses which they have been unable to collect,
or that their claim to a fair return on their original investment is in
any degree lessened? It is only necessary to state the facts clearly
to show the injustice of any such theory. Certainly the property of
public utility investors should not be confiscated merely because they
have not in the past charged rates high enough to offset the theo-
retical depreciation on such property. Only in the case too often
assumed to be typical, whereas it is in fact exceptional, where the
reserve against estimated future retirement losses is represented by
property added out of earnings in excess of a reasonable return to
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the investors, can the investment entitled to a return be fairly com-
puted by deducting the depreciation reserve from the investment
cost.
Now let us take the other horn of the dilemma. Instead of the
"investors' sacrifice" conception, let us start with.the idea that the
"fair value" upon which a return must be allowed is the economic
value, the price which a willing buyer would pay a willing seller in an
open market. Such a price, as any business man knows, would be
the capitalized value of probable future earnings. But in estimating
probable future earnings, would an experienced business man compute
the theoretical depredation on a straight line basis? In all likelihood
he would do nothing of the kind. He would, however, if he were mak-
ing a careful investment and not merely indulging in speculation,
make some estimate of what he might very probably call deprecia-
tion in the property, although he would not base it on life tables or
prophecies of future conditions in the industry reduced to a misleading
appearance of mathematical accuracy by the simple device of carrying
out to the third or fourth decimal place calculations whose unit figures
were just an educated-and sometimes not very well educated-
guess. When the experienced engineer or practical public utility
manager talks abotit "depreciation" he sometimes qualifies it by the
adjective "actual" or "observed" to distinguish what he has in
mind from the highly theoretical "accrued" depreciation which
assumes fixed life terms for certain classes of property. This is not
to say that such assumptions are altogether valueless. Theoretical
depreciation, if intelligently estimated and employed, may be of
interest and assistance in determining how much of a reserve it
would be desirable to raise if conditions permit. Such computations
or such reserve if raised, are based almost entirely upon speculation,
however, and they bear no more relation to the actual or "observed".
depreciation which an informed and practical man would find in the
plant at any time, than would the amount in a self-insurance fire
fund represent the actual fire losses at any particular date.
Actual, or "observed", depreciation is the diminution in value of
the actual property, as compared with the value of perfectly new
property, due to physical condition and to any obsolescence and in-
adequacy which is apparent. It represents the difference between
what a capable and intelligent manager, obliged to furnish the ser-
vice in question, would pay for perfectly new property and what he
would pay for the property in question. Such a man, in forming
his judgment, would consider whether by purchasing new property
he could get something more suitable, efficient or economical. Any
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advantages which new property would have in these respects rep-
resent obsolescence and inadequacy in the existing property, and
would be taken into consideration. Also deterioration in the wear-
ing parts, the repairs which have to be made immediately and the
accumulated liability for those which must be made in future, rep-
resent a further difference in value as compared with new property.
Mere age plays a small part in real, or "observed", depreciation.
Most of the elements in gas, electric, telephone, and telegraph
properties and, to a somewhat less extent (if we exclude track and
roadway construction), steam and electric railroads, water works
and other public utility properties do not wear out. Those minor
parts which do wear are renewed from time to time and the physical
condition depends upon the state of maintenance. Obsolescence and
inadequacy are the chief causes for ultimate retirement of the major
units, and these are not functions of age but of developments in the
art and in the service requirements. Improved methods, when
invented, render obsolete all apparatus or equipment of a particular
type whether the units be one, ten, or twenty years old. Until these
developments actually occur they cause no real depreciation. Until
the wise manager can see the possibility of getting something which
is improved in type, he will pay nothing extra for new apparatus
because of mere newness. He will pay only for any advantage it has
in actual physical condition. Social pride, if there be any, in owning
the latest model of gas machine is not translated into dollars by hard
headed engineers and business men who are looking only for the most
economical operation.
Actual depreciation is not a function of age or susceptible of math-
ematical computation." It depends upon the type of property, its
efficiency and suitability, its state of repair and its general physical
condition. These factors can be determined with reasonable accuracy
8Since this paper was written an interesting decision has been handed down
by the United States Board of Tax Appeals, (The Kinsman Transit Company,
January3i, i925. Decision No. 2o2, Docket No. 67), which contains the following
language:
"The reconstruction cost less actual depreciation sustained is important evi-
dence of value andhas init important elements to prove either the market value or
actual value; but depreciation is ordinarily something to be concretely determined
by inspection and, in determining the rate of depreciation to be applied to
property of the character herein for the purpose of ascertaining value as of a
particular date in the past, it is highly important that the history of the vessel,
the character of repairs, the actual use to which the vessel has been put, and all
relevant facts tending to show the depreciation sustained be placed before us,
and upon these facts, assisted by the testimony of such expert witnesses as may
be produced, a fair judgment can be exercised as to the amount of depreciation
sustained, which will more nearly approximate the actual depreciation sustained
than the application of a formula or fiat rate of theoretical depreciation which
only serves to produce grotesque results."
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by those familiar with such property and the attendant conditions.
The informed judgment of such men represents actual, or "observed"
depreciation. Insofar as depreciation affects the "value" of any
property, and is not to be considered necessarily as a measure of the
fund that should be maintained against probable future retirements,
it is observed depreciation only that can properly be taken as a de-
duction. And, be it clear, observed depreciation can be logically
deducted only from the "value", not the original cost nor the re-
production cost of a plant, unless such cost happens to correspond
at any particular time with the market value of an identical new
plant at the same time.
It is very important for clear thinking on the much mistreated
topic of "depreciation" to carry always in mind the distinction be-
tween "cost" and "value" and between "accrued depreciation" and
"observed depreciation." Most of us think we know the difference
between the first two but there is an unfortunate tendency, in dis-
cussions of public utility regulation, either to assume that "cost"
and "value" are interchangeable when such an assumption happens
to support the speaker's argument, or to assume that the "fair value"
of a public utility property has some peculiar esoteric meaning when
used by law makers and courts that is different from its ordinary
economic sense of the price that would be paid in an open market
by a willing buyer to a willing seller. One or the other of these assump-
tions has to be made as a logical basis for deducting accrued de-
preciation from invested capital to determine a fair rate-base. As
we have seen, if "value" is considered to be practically synonymous
with "cost", either historical or reproduction, a case can be made
under certain conditions for deducting the theoretical depreciation
reserve. But only under those conditions which, in practice, seldom
exist. On the other hand, if "value for rate-making purposes" means
market value in the ordinary economic sense, observed depreciation
can logically be deducted from value new but "accrued" depreciation
cannot. "Value new less accrued depreciation" as a basis for de-
termining the reasonable rate-base for a public utility property is,
therefore, a purely artificial and illogical formula and ultimately
commissions and courts will so determine.
The distinction between "accrued depreciation" and "observed
depreciation" is frequently, perhaps generally disregarded; never-
theless, it is fundamental. The amount of "accrued depreciation"
at any given time is highly speculative, depending on estimates of
future losses which, in turn, depend on the assumption that, for some
remote future period, obsolescence (i.e., the necessity for retiring
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parts of the plant because of inventions and improved methods),
inadequacy (i.e., the necessity for retiring parts of the plant because
of the growing demands of the community which it serves), and wear
and tear, will all cause losses that in the aggregate will be the same
as the losses that have been suffered from these same causes in some
more or less arbitrarily selected past period. "Observed deprecia-
tion", on the other hand, can be quite closely determined through an
accurate inspection, by one who knows his business. It is clearly
possible for such an observer to inspect a gas plant and say, "this
part will last a year or two more; that part will last indefinitely
unless it becomes obsolete or we have to put in a unit with greater
capacity", and so compute the proportion to date of a definitely
foreseen liability for renewals and replacements. This is hard and
practical common sense and there can be no question in the minds
of intelligent persons that actual depreciation is a factor affecting
market value. But it is absurd and it is also unjust, uneconomic and
illegal for a regulatory 6ommission to reduce the amount of a public
utility's investment entitled to a fair return, by the amount of a
purely hypothetical depreciation reserve which it has never earned
and does not possess, however desirable it might be that such a re-
serve should exist.
We may summarize the foregoing discussion as follows:
There are two points of view from which depreciation may be
considered,-that of lessening value and that of cost accounting.
Confusion of these two view points works injustice. Straight- line
depreciation as a measure of diminishing value is highly artificial
and bears litle or no relation to true value. But as a method of cost
accounting it may be employed and from this point of view it is,
under certain circumstances, logical to deduct the theoretical de-
preciation reserve accumulated on a straight line basis from the in-
vestment cost to determine a reasonable rate-base, provided the
"value for rate-making purposes" is taken to represent the investors'
sacrifice and not the market value of the property. The conditions
under which this may properly be done are that the utility shall have
had in the past an income sufficient to pay its investors a fair re-
turn on their investment and in addition to accumulate a reserve
against future retirement losses equal to the proportion of such es-
timated losses on property at the time in service which would have
accrued if the total estimated loss could be spread evenly over the
normal life of such property.
If the diminishing value concept of depreciation is retained, then
the only kind of depreciation which a practical business man would
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consider as affecting the value of a public utility property is "ob-
served depreciation" which is very different from "straight line",
"theoretical" or "accrued" depreciation. Observed depreciation
takes account of the definitely foreseen expenditures for mainte-
nance and renewals without much regard to the age or history of the
property. It is practical, not theoretical, and can logically be de-
ducted from the market value of an identical new property to find
the actual present or depreciated value.
In conclusion it may be desirable to emphasize that this paper is
not an attack on the "straight line theory" of accounting for depre-
ciation, per se. It is the illogical misapplication of the theory in
determining "value for rate-making" that is criticized. Uncertain
and approximate as all estimates of retirement loss must necessarily
be, it is, nevertheless, generally the part of prudence to make such
estimates and to include in any statement of operating costs for a
particular period, that period's approximate proportion of the as yet
unknown and unrealized losses. It should never be forgotten how-
ever, that such charges are only approximate and cannot represent
an actual equal apportionment of retirement losses except within
very wide margins. The utmost that any regulatory commission
should attempt to do is to fix maximum and minimum limits for
these margins, stated in very general terms. To go beyond this is
to confuse regulation with management. If thereafter a utility is
fortunate enough to be able to pay its investors a reasonable return
and in addition to accumulate through charges within the limits
recognized as reasonable by the regulatory body a depreciation or
retirement reserve, the owners will not seriously object to the ex-
clusion of the assets represented by such reserve from the assets
that measure their investment in the enterprise. But the notion
that the amount of such a reserve, whether represented by actual
assets or merely by a book liability, is a measure of lost value in
their property, will very properly be resisted until all the courts
and commissions have seen the light as a few of them have seen it
already.
